TRANSLATING POLICIES INTO INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS’ CRITICAL SERVICES: REFRAMING, ANCHORING AND MUDDLING THROUGH

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SUMMARY

This paper examines how policies and plans are translated into informal settlements’ practice. It builds on literature on policy implementation practice and organization studies, and more particularly, it applies the concepts of reframing, anchoring and muddling through. The paper is informed by the case of Kisumu City in Kenya and its Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste Management Plan and its implementation on Kisumu’s informal settlements. The plan was funded by the Swedish International Development Agency through the United Nations Human Settlement Programme and implemented from 2007 to 2009. The study is based on action research carried out by a multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary group of researchers, through focus groups, participatory workshops, collaborative action, in-depth interviews, document analysis and observations. The paper examines what original aspects of Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste Management Plan were translated, that is, which ones faded out and which ones became stabilized into and travel as ‘best practices’ to other locations. The paper shows how the generation of ‘best practices’ can be loosely coupled with the practices that policy seeks to change. It concludes, in line with previous research in the field, how successful policy implementation is based on cultural and political interpretations rather on evidence of improved practices. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

KEY WORDS—policy implementation practice; implementation gap; best practices; framing; anchoring; muddle through; waste management; informal settlements

INTRODUCTION

Both development policy-making and research are concerned with the disparities between the ambitions of policies and the practices they actually achieve on the ground (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Mosse, 2004; Owens et al., 2006; Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013a; Czarniawska, 2012). Despite its importance, research on policy implementation is often limited to a linear and rational view, which excludes the role of political and informal domains (Heeks and Stanforth, 2014). To develop a better understanding of this gap between policy and practice, this paper examines how policies and plans are actually translated into practice by the many involved parties.

The case informing the analysis is the waste management plan (Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste Management Plan (KISWAMP)) in Kisumu, Kenya. KISWAMP was funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) through the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and implemented from 2007 to 2009 (UN-Habitat, 2007). Waste management is a suitable object of study for the analysis of policy implementation because all cities provide such services with different levels of efficiency and resources. Furthermore, development aid programmes have targeted waste management in Global South cities as a means

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to support job creation among low-income citizens and youth, improve public health, increase recycling and reduce cities’ environmental footprints (UN-Habitat, 2010). Yet, the processes through which these global, national and local programmes aim to achieve their goals have largely been overlooked in the literature.

The present paper builds on the literature on policy implementation practice (Long, 2001; Mosse, 2004) and organization studies (Czarniawska, 2002; 2010; 2013; Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013a; 2014) for its analytical framework. Ethnographic research on policy-making and project implementation practice has shown that ‘successful’ implementation of plans and policies depends on the stabilization of particular interpretations of a policy. Therefore, the appropriate question is not ‘whether but how development projects work; not whether a project succeeds, but how success is produced’ (Mosse, 2004, p.646). This paper contributes to develop a better understanding of the gap between policy and practice in public administration and development studies by examining three particular aspects of policy implementation practice: framing, anchoring and muddling through (Czarniawska, 2002; 2014).

The following section introduces the literature on waste management policies in informal urban settlements in the Global South. Next, the theoretical framework is presented. Thereafter, the methodology section explains how the empirical data were gathered and analysed. The results are presented as a reconstruction of KISWAMP and its translations into waste management in Kisumu’s informal settlements. We continue by examining which aspects of KISWAMP were stabilized into local practice, which aspects travelled further as ‘best practices’ (master ideas and norms of success that are taken for granted for a given situation) and which aspects were not translated, and therefore faded away. Our analysis is then discussed as actions of framing/reframing, anchoring and muddling through. The paper concludes with remarks on how policies and plans become translated, fade away, stabilize and/or travel.

WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMMES IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

Various waste management programmes have been implemented in informal settlements of the Global South. They have often been initiated by bulldozing the settlements, followed by a reconstruction of both housing and infrastructure (Patel, 2013). In other cases, local entrepreneurs and their informal services have simply been substituted by private corporations (Zapata Campos and Hall, 2013). Many programmes, typically financed by international agencies, have been designed and implemented top-down, securing the compliance of local actors through their high dependence on the resources provided by the donors (Sampson, 2003).

However, public officials can use donor funding in ways that better suit their city’s needs (Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013a). There are projects where the focus has been on residents and waste pickers as co-producers of basic services in partnerships with local governments, rather than as recipients of services from aid programmes (Zapata Campos and Zapata 2013b; Yates and Gutberlet 2011). In the absence of formal waste services, an extensive informal sector of waste pickers has become involved in collecting and recycling household waste (Gutberlet, 2012, Katuiimeh et al., 2013, Oteng-Ababio et al., 2013). These informal waste pickers contribute significantly to carbon footprint reduction (da Silva Carvalho et al., 2012; Mitlin, 2008; Wilson et al., 2008), resource recovery, improvement of environmental conditions and health of low-income residents and job creation among the poor. However, programmes supporting informal waste picker organizations at the micro level face many challenges. It can take decades for innovative solutions to be scaled up to other parts of a city or to other cities (Hardoy et al., 2001), and achievements can wither when the funding ends because ‘induced networks’ and public–private partnerships have not achieved self-management (Tirado-Soto and Zamberlan, 2013).

A common ingredient in co-produced programmes is the waste transfer point (UN-Habitat, 2010), where waste collected from households is stored until being evacuated to landfills or recycling centres. If the city fails to evacuate the transfer point, then the private or community partners will obtain problems as people in the settlements see an un-evacuated transfer point as a potential new local dump site, that is, as a negative consequence of the waste collection activity. Governmental arrangements created for co-production of waste collection services (e.g. licensing and remuneration of waste pickers or regular evacuation of transfer points) therefore call for regular and long-term relationships, where networks and partnerships are integrated in local governance structures (Joshi and Moore,
The functioning of such partnerships often rests on support from municipalities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for warehouses, equipment and promotion of the work of waste pickers in the settlements (Tirado-Soto and Zamberlan, 2013). Co-produced waste management services thus rest on the strengthening of local governments, building capacities of municipal officers and establishing collaborative arrangements between local actors. Otherwise, there is a high risk that local governments remain suspicious about the role waste pickers can play or that they simply do not fulfill signed agreements (Yates and Gutberlet 2011; Zapata Campos and Zapata 2013b; Joshi and Moore 2004).

As described, many different types of both top-down to bottom-up waste management initiative have been launched to tackle solid waste predicaments. Yet, in both policy and research, there is an increasing concern with the disparities that exist between these policies, especially top-down programmes, and what they achieve in practice (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Mosse 2004; Owens et al., 2006; Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013a).

**POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES**

Ethnographic research on policy-making has revealed discrepancies between ideal goals, coupled to a linear view of policy implementation, and observed practices on the ground (Long, 2001; Mosse, 2004; Rap, 2006). From an instrumental and positivistic approach, successful implementation refers to measurable achievements of policy objectives. This linear and rational approach to policy neglects the roles of the informal and the political (Bogason and Toonen, 1998; Heeks and Stanforth, 2014). Ethnographic research in development studies has shown that success depends upon the stabilization of particular interpretations of a policy and that this stabilization, in turn, depends on the ability of actors to recruit support for this interpretation of the policy (Mosse, 2004). In a similar note, Rap (2006) has argued that the success of a policy model, rather than being based on straightforward and quantitative evidence of improved management performance (Heeks and Stanforth, 2014), often is bounded to the cultural performance of success.

Still, the policy implementation practice is under-researched (Heeks and Stanforth, 2014; Mosse, 2004; 2005; Struyk, 2007; Umans, 2012). What occurs during implementation, how this process is related to policy outputs and how policies are adopted, translated and transformed among ministries, development agencies, consultants, project managers and beneficiaries, remain under-scrutinized (Mosse, 2005; Rottenburg, 2009; Zapata and Zapata Campos, 2014). Zapata Campos and Zapata (2014) have shown how aid policy implementation cannot be reduced to simple compliance, assimilation and appropriation of plans transferred from top-down. Instead, plans and policies are locally contested before eventually being accepted or rejected (Rossi, 2006; Sulle, 2010). From a pragmatist perspective in organization studies, policy implementation is similarly perceived as being loosely coupled to formal structures and goals (Czarniawska, 2002, 2011). This perspective does not make policy documents, plans and goals less important but sees them as rationality rituals (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) rather than as the central focus of policy implementation (Czarniawska, 2001; Czarniawska, 2004). This shifts the focus from the efficiency and success of policies and plans characteristic of linear and rational perspectives to the process of gaining and maintaining legitimacy and support for a successful view of a policy. Czarniawska (2002; 2004) maintains that the organizing of cities, including the formulation and implementation of policy and the cultural performance of their success, involve three specific types of action: framing and reframing (Goffman, 1974), anchoring (Czarniawska, 2001; Czarniawska, 2004) and muddling through (Lindblom, 1959; 1979).

**Framing and reframing** refers to the process of changing the frame of interpretation of the world in order to take successful action by replacing old frames with new ones (Goffman, 1974). Reframing implies the alignment of the goals of an actor with potential supporters, to gain legitimacy, mobilize resources and enrol supporters towards collective action (Snow et al., 1986) and policy implementation. It occurs when a given policy is rendered meaningful and thereby functions to guide action and change (Benford and Snow, 2000). **Anchoring** converges with the process of reframing and refers to the process of collaborating with potentially involved parties around new ideas in order to enrol them, strengthen cooperation and overcome resistance (Czarniawska, 2002; 2004). However, policies are also transformed by those who are enrolled in anchoring them, such as public officers, aid staff, community
members, residents or local entrepreneurs. Consequently, policies are translated into the different logics (intentions, goals and ambitions) of the many people and organizations they bring together (Mosse, 2005). *Muddling through* (Lindblom, 1959; 1979) describes how the practice of planning and policy implementation is not primarily about reaching goals or putting plans in operation. Rather, it is ‘an essentially contested, political and messy process’ (Leach et al., 2008: 735), ‘coping with daily problems (or managing, as the double meaning of the word in English astutely suggests)’ (Czarniawska, 2001: 2). In the Discussion section, we return to examining the translation of KISWAMP into practice by applying these three aspects of policy implementation practice: framing and reframing, anchoring and muddling through.

**METHODOLOGY**

The paper is based on a case study of KISWAMP, a development project funded by SIDA through UN-Habitat and carried out in Kisumu, Kenya, from 2007 to 2009 (UN-Habitat, 2007). Albeit KISWAMP ended in 2009, it has gained new relevance as a policy document through a new development programme, the Kisumu Urban Project (KUP). From 2014 to 2016, we have gathered data about KISWAMP’s implementation phase 2007–2009, KISWAMP’s subsequent implications on waste practices and how KUP has picked up KISWAMP elements in emerging waste policies and practices.

The multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary research team consisted of a public official, a waste entrepreneur and five researchers from different disciplines. Two of the researchers are Kisumu based, and the three others are Sweden based. The whole team gathered in Kisumu for 1 week on three different occasions during 2014 and 2015. These weeks consisted of a mix of data collection methods. Additionally, the Kisumu-based researchers have collected complementary data *in situ*. Interviews have also been conducted in Nairobi (UN-Habitat and NGOs) and in Sweden (former UN-Habitat officer and SIDA staff). In total, the team has carried out extensive document analyses, field observations (around 30 different localities/activities), in-depth interviews (46), focus group discussions with residents and waste pickers in Obunga and Nyalenda informal settlements (4), stakeholder workshops (4) and waste clean-up exercises (6) in Obunga and Nyalenda (Appendix A). Interviews and workshops covered a wide range of stakeholders, such as residents, waste pickers, waste entrepreneurs, recyclers, community-based organizations (CBOs), NGOs, public officials from ward, city, county and state levels, researchers, UN-Habitat officers, development aid donors and professionals and a former mayor of Kisumu.

Most interviews were conducted in group with the participation of the municipal officer, the waste entrepreneur and the researchers. To reduce feelings of intimidation and to improve the contextualization of the gathered data, the interviews were, when possible, conducted in the working place of the interviewee, or in the case of residents at the local residents association, and other members of the organization/neighbourhood were invited to participate. All focus group discussions were held at local resident associations. The participants were informed (in Kiswahili and Dholuo languages when needed) that they could withdraw at any time without any hard feelings. All interviews, workshops and focus group discussions were recorded for a detailed analysis. During the last research week, preliminary results were presented and discussed with local stakeholders and residents in public participatory workshops (3) with resident associations, municipality and county.

The analysis started by sorting, coding and probing the data from the first research week, inspired by the categories of framing, anchoring and muddling through. Discussing these preliminary results under the prism of these concepts and the literature in the field assisted in collecting complementary data during the second and third research weeks and by the local team, until the process of implementing KISWAMP into practice was reconstructed. This ‘back-and-forth’ research strategy, inspired by Strauss and Corbin (1990), is neither purely deductive nor inductive but follows patterns of creative abduction (Shurz, 2008) that base the knowledge creation process on strong local, empirical background knowledge of the researchers. This approach is typically used in data mining, theory formation and theory revision (Prendinger and Ishizuka, 2005). The emergent features within each of the three types of action (framing, anchoring and muddling through) were collapsed into a model that elaborates the original theory (Czarniawska, 2002) further and contributes to explain the features and process of policy implementation informed by the case at hand.
RESULTS: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WASTE MANAGEMENT IN KISUMU’S INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

In the succeeding texts, we introduce the situation of Kisumu’s informal settlements. Thereafter, we reconstruct the role of KISWAMP in Kisumu’s waste management services until today and conclude this section by describing the key traits of the current waste management.

Kisumu’s informal settlements

Kisumu is the third largest city in Kenya, with an estimated population of more than 500,000 and an urbanization rate of 1.86 per cent yearly (County Government of Kisumu, 2015). The city has a planned city centre and a large unplanned peri-urban fringe where more than 50 per cent of its population live in informal settlements with very poor housing conditions, frail service delivery, unclear legalities and poor policy design (Onyango and Kibwage, 2008; Figure 1). Although the situation varies from one informal settlement to another, vehicle accessibility is often limited for the interior of the slums due to potholes and damaged drains, and access to main roads is mostly by bicycles, motorbikes and handcarts. Community toilets and showers are scarce and often unhygienic, and household waste is hardly collected. The unhygienic living conditions cause serious health problems, with diseases like malaria and typhoid (Onyango and Kibwage, 2008).

Figure 1. Informal settlements in Kisumu. (B) Obunga, (D) Manyatta, and (H) Nyalenda. The Kachok waste dump site is located just above the letter H in the map. Source: cities without slums—UN-Habitat (2002)
Kiswamp

A joint proposal to SIDA was developed in 2006 by the Municipal Council of Kisumu, UN-Habitat, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the NGO Practical Action and the SWM Working Group organizing the city’s waste actors: KISWAMP. The plan aimed at involving CBOs and small/micro-enterprises in providing waste management services for the urban poor. Here, it borrowed heavily from the practices in urban environmental management, employment creation and improved service delivery developed by the ILO in Dar es Salaam through a public private partnership (PPP) approach. In summary, the objectives of KISWAMP were as follows (UN-Habitat, 2007):

- to create awareness on the rights and roles of the members of the public in SWM;
- to strengthen the council’s institutional capacity in planning, delivery and management of waste services;
- to enforce reviewed by-laws, as well as fee collection, monitoring and evaluation systems;
- to promote private sector linkages and pro-poor public–private partnerships to create employment and wealth for the urban poor, especially women and youth;
- to provide start-up machinery for the municipal council;
- to relocate the current dump site to a long-term sanitary landfill;
- to create new and support existing waste management initiatives among waste collection groups and informal waste pickers, that is, by establishing a micro-finance institution; and
- to promote the KISWAMP model within the Lake Victoria region.

The proposal was funded by SIDA to run from August 2007 to June 2009. A local coordinating unit was created with the SWM Working Group at the centre of the implementation, supported by Maseno University, UN-Habitat, SIDA, the municipality and civil society organizations. Consultants were contracted to train and strengthen the abilities of policy makers and officials in the city and county councils, as well as to carry out technical studies on collection routes, vehicles and systems. ILO and the Kisumu Polytechnic College trained community groups, and CBOs operating in the informal settlements were brought to the programme for its implementation.

Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste Management Plan thus originated as a top-down programme but with a participatory approach and ambitions to integrate already existing practices in its design. It was shaped to be experimental for later upscaling to other cities around Lake Victoria and beyond (interview with former municipal officer). At the end of the programme, key achievements included baseline survey on SWM in Kisumu, Kisumu Integrated Sustainable SWM Strategy 2010–2020, KISWAMP communication strategy, review of SWM by-laws, environmental awareness creation, capacity building and training for waste actors, Kisumu Waste Management Association (KIWAMA) Savings and Credit Co-operative for waste actors and a guarantee fund for waste actors and purchase of SWM vehicles and equipment.

Waste management in Kisumu today

When this is written in 2016, KISWAMP has only been partially implemented, and understanding the impact of KISWAMP is challenging due to lack of consistent data. Still, a parallel reading of two key documents may reveal some insights: the KISWAMP baseline report from 2008 (Onyango and Kibwage, 2008) and the new Kisumu Integrated SWM Strategy from 2015 (County Government of Kisumu, 2015), including its more extensive draft version.

Solid waste collection in Kisumu today is carried out by the city council, registered companies with permits and small private (sometimes informal) entrepreneurs. The current amount of household waste is estimated to be 76 500 tonnes annually (County Government of Kisumu, 2015) compared with 160 000 tonnes in 2008 (Onyango and Kibwage, 2008). Collection estimates range from 25 per cent of this waste (County Government of Kisumu, 2015) to 20 per cent (Nodalis Counseil, 2009) and the very low 7 per cent (Onyango and Kibwage, 2008). Again, due to the uncertainty linked to these numbers, it is difficult to assess any impact of KISWAMP. For example, is it likely that the generation of household waste has halved while, at the same time, the population is estimated to have grown from 400 000 to almost 500 000 inhabitants (County Government of Kisumu, 2015).
Similar to 2008, the city only manages to collect solid waste from the central business district and market areas (Onyango and Kibwage, 2008; County Government of Kisumu, 2015). In residential areas, less than 2 per cent is collected by the city, while 25 per cent is managed by private collectors with very limited capacity and depending on the residents’ financial ability and willingness to pay for the services (County Government of Kisumu, 2015). The remaining household waste is managed by the households themselves and is mainly (69.9%) left in open spaces, along roadsides and in drainage trenches (County Government of Kisumu, 2015). Because these numbers largely are identical to the 2008 situation (Onyango and Kibwage, 2008), no improvement can be established. However, as more than 63 per cent of the waste is organic and 27 per cent other recyclables (County Government of Kisumu, 2015), the potential for improvement is significant.

Although there is a lack of reliable data, our field studies (Gutberlet et. al., 2016) demonstrated how SWM in Kisumu continues to suffer from weak finances, feeble political and institutional support, poor community attitudes and lack of a systematic approach as was observed already in 2008 (Onyango and Kibwage, 2008). The open waste dump located within the urbanized area is a disaster. The city barely manages to collect waste in the central business district and main markets due to lack of staff and machinery. More affluent households contract different types of private actor to collect their waste, while the majority of the households in informal settlements are left with few options to deal with their waste. The result is a massive accumulation of waste on foot paths and empty lots, in drains, along roadsides and at the locations where the waste skips used to be located when still operated through KISWAMP. However, services of small private entrepreneurs are gaining ground also in the informal settlements among those households that can afford a small fee for collection (Gutberlet et. al., 2016).

Today, KUP is reviewing and partially recovering KISWAMP to create a new policy on integrated SWM (County Government of Kisumu, 2015). Through its Kisumu Integrated SWM Strategy 2015–2025, KUP aims to construct a sanitary landfill, resuscitate some of the KISWAMP strategies and continue to support the city’s and county’s waste management policies (County Government of Kisumu, 2015).

**ANALYSIS: HOW WAS KISWAMP TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICE?**

In this section, based on KISWAMP’s original goals and activities, we examine what actions have been adopted and stabilized into local practice, which ones have faded out and which ones have become stabilized into best practices and travelled to other parts of the city or to other cities in the region. Table 1 summarizes the activities proposed by KISWAMP together with the translations of those activities into practice in Kisumu’s informal settlements and the city at large.

**Waste entrepreneurship**

A positive aspect was that KISWAMP to ‘90 per cent’ was based on what was happening in Kisumu (interview with former municipal officer and former UN-Habitat officer), such as existing waste picking practices and youth group activities. It provided training and capacity building and promoted study trips to Dar es Salaam to learn from another ILO project. Through this, the programme supported existing CBOs and succeeded to mobilize local entrepreneurship, for example, through the transformation of youth groups into micro-entrepreneurs. This was evaluated as very positive by participants as it developed capacity and created jobs in low-income areas. Waste was turned from something to discard into a resource: ‘waste is money, considered as employment opportunities’ (interview with former municipal officer). The number of strong waste entrepreneurs grew from 3 to 12. Some women groups were also encouraged to produce handicraft in the form of collars or bags from recycled products (interview with Tema Tema Women Group).

Although only a few entrepreneurs benefited from the KIWAMA Savings and Credit Co-operative because of weak financial management and non-competitive interest rates, KIWAMA has been used as a joint voice to lobby the administration when necessary (interview with waste entrepreneur). As an example, they filed a complaint against the county to prevent a multinational waste corporation to obtain the monopoly of waste collection in...
the city. Waste-picker organizations in Kisumu are also members of international and national waste management organization and exchange experiences with organizations in Nairobi and Mombasa. Through international networks (e.g. WIEGO), the experiences of these entrepreneurs and CBOs travel out, and new ideas are brought in (interview with Bamato CBO). In this way, they also contribute to the diffusion of KISWAMP as a best practice.

In the neighbourhoods where waste pickers are now established and provide services, residents acknowledge that the environment is cleaner (focus groups in Nyalenda and interviews with residents in Manyatta). These entrepreneurs have gained the trust to establish waste management services on which the residents can rely on and for which they will pay. They have succeeded to create a market for waste collection services in spite of the sometimes delimited resources among the residents. Even so, the working conditions for the actual waste pickers are often harsh and unhealthy, especially for the most informal waste pickers, ‘scavenging’ around households and at waste dumps for recyclables to sell (focus groups in Nyalenda and Obunga). Also, waste pickers will not obtain a salary if they are sick or if they do not work for other reasons (interview with waste picker). Their income from recyclables is also skimmed by international market fluctuations or local market deficiencies.

In spite of the positive experiences from waste entrepreneurship, informal settlements, such as Obunga, with the poorest residents and weakest CBO networks but with significant needs of improved waste collection services and employment opportunities were somehow forgotten by KISWAMP and left out of the pilot implementation.

Table 1. Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste Management Plan (KISWAMP) in translation

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<tr>
<th>KISWAMP activities</th>
<th>Translations into practice</th>
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| Waste micro-entrepreneurs and community-based organizations (CBOs) | From 3 to 12 strong entrepreneurs, transformation of some CBOs into micro-enterprises  
Successfully based on already existing practices  
Waste entrepreneurs, when operating successfully, generate trust among households.  
No waste entrepreneurs in poorest slums  
The credit guarantee scheme is underutilized.  
The Kisumu Waste Management Association (KIWAMA) was created, although it is having difficulties to operate.  
Local, national and international waste picker networks are emerging.  
Low paid and unhealthy working conditions for waste pickers |
| Citywide sustainable waste management strategy           | A baseline survey, a consultation process and a strategy document were created, but no measures were implemented in the informal settlements.  
Waste management gained status in the city.  
Politicians and officials were trained, but they dispersed to other positions.  
Institutional empowerment also stopped when the money dried up. Political and financial sustainability was not well considered. |
| Waste transfer points                                   | Skips were placed in transfer points, without the collaboration with the communities or informal waste pickers in the area.  
Skips rusted, were insufficient or not emptied, were vandalized and stolen, of the wrong size and not replaced.  
No maintenance nor financial mechanisms were planned.  
Nowadays, the locations where the skips used to be are (il)legally used not only as informal dumps by residents and private collectors but also as secondary collection points for formal waste picker entrepreneurs. |
| Pro-poor partnerships                                   | Collaboration arrangements between the city and waste pickers to evacuate waste transfer points remain loose and arbitrary.                                                                                                                                                         |
| Promoting KISWAMP model                                 | KISWAMP is evaluated as a programme with a good participatory design, well grounded in local practices, which failed to be subsequently implemented. Yet, it is described as a successful story by many of the involved actors. |
Waste management and the city administration

Municipal officers argued that as a result of KISWAMP, waste management has gained a higher status within the city administration (interview with former mayor and municipal officers). Several UN-Habitat officials agree, in separate interviews, that the programme was successful because ‘KISWAMP was a Kisumu City’s affair and it was adopted at the policy level’. As a result, ‘a waste management system and a strategy is put in place’ (interview with former UN-Habitat officer).

Nevertheless, most respondents agree that even if the programme were well formulated and grounded in participatory processes, it failed to be fully implemented (interviews with UN-Habitat officers, SIDA officer, municipal officer and waste entrepreneur). They claim that political and financial sustainability was not well considered in the plan. The developed strategy was never adopted as a policy by the municipal assembly, and the revised by-laws failed to implement the recommended policy directions. KISWAMP also lacked an investment plan, and when the programme ended in 2009, the municipality failed to budget appropriately. Additionally, the institutional empowerment to the city council did not work as planned. Despite the training activities to strengthen politicians and officers, capacity has been lost as many public administration officers are no longer working for the city. When the money dried up, the activities stopped and the qualified staff left. Also, according to some respondents, the management structure within the city’s environment department and existing policies do not fully allow operationalization of PPPs (interviews with waste entrepreneurs). An example is the temporary recognition letters given to waste operators by the city which do not allow them to operate into more formal areas of the city (interview with former municipal officer).

In relation to the failed implementation of KISWAMP, a critical voice claimed that ‘there was a problem of local ownership’ as UN-Habitat managed the project from Nairobi from which ‘they were patronizing us’ (interview with local NGO officer). According to the interviewee, the external control over the decision-making of KISWAMP was hindering its implementation and the involvement of civil society and local authorities.

Waste transfer points

In 2010, skip containers were placed at strategic locations in the city to provide an infrastructure for collecting household waste in informal settlements. However, the number of skips provided by the programme was insufficient, and some were of the wrong size or too fragile. The programme also failed to provide the right mechanism, equipment and financial resources to maintain the skips and to evacuate them when they were full. Also, the implementation of the skips was not performed in collaboration with the local communities or the informal waste pickers already active in the area. All in all, the result was that most skips rusted were set on fire (when not emptied for several weeks) and finally sold as scrap metal.

Although the skips are now missing, residents still dispose their waste at the sites where the skips used to be. This creates a number of illegal dump sites, although their illegitimacy may be questioned because these are still the sites where waste should formally be collected (scholarly workshop on waste management in informal settlements, Kisumu 2014). Illegal or not, those locations are the few points in the city that resemble secondary waste transfer points, linking the informal settlements to the city waste dump and used by both waste entrepreneurs and the city. However, because these spaces are not properly prepared to store waste and waste is evacuated rarely and irregularly, neighbours complain about their conditions.

Pro-poor partnerships

Pro-poor partnerships were planned to be developed between the waste picker entrepreneurs and the city to evacuate and transport waste from the settlements to the city dump site. Yet, these arrangements remained loose and informal. As mentioned in the preceding texts, some of the spaces where the skips used to be are informally used as transfer points. For example, in Manyatta, waste transfer points are full of waste during collection days (Friday and Saturday) with the consequent inconveniences for the neighbours. The informal arrangements to evacuate this waste vary from waste picker to waste picker. For example, in Migosi, two entrepreneurs have informal agreements...
with the municipal waste truck driver (interviews with local waste entrepreneurs). Other small waste pickers transport their waste to the dump site by push carts or just dump it illegally elsewhere, for example, at the locations where the skips used to be or in empty lots along main roads. A particular problem is that the fees at the dump site seem to vary depending on position and negotiating power, being detrimental to the goal of obtaining as much waste to the dump as possible.

Promoting KISWAMP as best practice

The KISWAMP programme, or rather accounts of it, has travelled well outside of Kisumu. For example, the idea of establishing pedagogic environmental centres has spread to Uganda and Tanzania (interview with former municipal officer). In 2010, Mwanza and Kisumu municipal officials visited each other to exchange experiences. In Mwanza, community clean-ups led by women have now turned out to be very successful, although such ideas may well have other origins than KISWAMP (interview with UN-Habitat officer). Another expression of how well KISWAMP has travelled internationally as a best practice is it being presented frequently at the World Urban Forum and other conferences (interview with former UN-Habitat officer).

Although travelling well is a best practice and promoted as such by some actors (interviews with UN-Habitat officers and SIDA officer), local actors in Kisumu to a large extent talk about parts of KISWAMP as a failure (interviews with residents and waste entrepreneurs). Furthermore, KUP has picked up some of the successful stories from KISWAMP in their review of Kisumu’s waste strategy. The reviewed KISWAMP will continue to build on local best practices developed (often from ideas introduced by Kiswa, as the use of transfer points) by residents, CBOs and private enterprises compared with what other cities are doing (interview with project consultant).

In words of one of the consultants in charge of the strategy review, the aim is ‘to beat it [the strategy] with success stories’. As a result, both the CBOs and the waste entrepreneurs that succeeded to survive, and some of them to continue growing after KISWAMP, are seen as best practices to be upscaled and diffused by KUP throughout the city and to other cities in the region. KUP also aims to retake the idea of transfer points and turn them into waste-recovery centres, supported by processes of waste separation at source. Another practice that has been turned into a norm are the community clean-ups as a main mechanism for waste management in poor neighbourhoods, sometimes in parallel, and reinforcing the work of local waste entrepreneurs.

DISCUSSION

In the succeeding texts, we discuss the translation of KISWAMP into practice, based on the three aspects of policy implementation: framing and reframing, anchoring and muddling through (Table 2).

Framing and reframing

The formulation and implementation of KISWAMP reframed waste management from a problem into a resource and rendered it meaningful as a source of employment for low-income residents of informal settlements, a decent profession and a respectful public environmental service (interview with municipal officer). Yet, not all groups and settlements in the city were included in the framing, as we elaborate in the following.

Waste was reframed from a problem into a resource and a source of employment by aligning KISWAMP to existing waste entrepreneurship practices. The transformation of residents and youth groups into entrepreneurs was an idea disseminated previously by NGOs in Kisumu’s informal settlements. To turn public services into business and work opportunities for low-income residents is widespread in the international aid development sector and has been promoted during the last decades by international organizations, such as ILO and UN-Habitat (Thieme, 2015). Existing waste entrepreneurs providing services in Kisumu’s informal settlements were thus practices which UN-Habitat and ILO officers and consultants could easily relate to as a fruitful approach. They were aligned with their organizational repertoire of master ideas/solutions addressing the lack of critical services in these contexts. For example, similar ideas of promoting environmental entrepreneurship as a solution to the lack of water, sanitation or waste management services in informal settlements have been promoted by United Nations Development Program,
The consultants and officers in charge of the design of KISWAMP thus picked up ideas that many actors were already familiar with, reframed them and packaged them as new. This process of self-reinforcement facilitated that KISWAMP subsequently was labelled an innovative best practice. Such processes of self-imitation have been labelled as auto-morphism (Czarniawska, 2002; Schwartz, 2009), whereby ideas are selected and adopted (i.e. existing waste entrepreneurship practices) as they remind involved officers of their own past activities and organizational repertoire. Moreover, most of the people who participated in the elaboration and implementation of KISWAMP have changed to different positions in different organizations before and after KISWAMP (interview with municipal officer), in this way contributing to further diffuse ideas, such as waste entrepreneurship or waste transfer stations among the practitioners in the field and turning these ideas into persuasive master ideas (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996).

Waste management services were also reframed as a necessity in informal settlements, and residents were enrolled in new waste collection practices and persuaded to pay for these new services, as has been seen elsewhere (Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013b). CBOs and entrepreneurs marketed (or reframed) the need for waste collection services via community clean-ups, where they cleaned up the neighbourhoods free of charge and showed the value of a clean environment and, hence, of waste collection services. Waste entrepreneurs contributed with their work to reframe ideas and demands for cleanliness in these communities.

Finally, waste management was introduced as a municipal strategy that gained status internally. Waste management was reframed, beyond traditional definitions of collecting and managing waste, into an environmental, social and economic policy. Waste was transformed (i.e. reframed) from being a dirty problem to be solved by the municipality into a respected environmental service provided in collaboration with informal waste pickers with the capability to create jobs among the poor. By so doing, it achieved a higher status among both politicians and municipal officers.

Yet, despite the revalorization of informal waste picking as a profession, the stigma of waste picking persists, especially for those informal waste pickers who work individually. Similarly, and despite the progress made in

<table>
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<td>Waste entrepreneurship</td>
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<td>Not well anchored in local materials, design, community’s practices and ongoing waste activities</td>
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</table>

United Nations Environmental Program or the ILO, together with the multiplicity of development agencies, NGOs, officers and consultants involved in their implementation. The consultants and officers in charge of the design of KISWAMP thus picked up ideas that many actors were already familiar with, reframed them and packaged them as new. This process of self-reinforcement facilitated that KISWAMP subsequently was labelled an innovative best practice. Such processes of self-imitation have been labelled as auto-morphism (Czarniawska, 2002; Schwartz, 2009), whereby ideas are selected and adopted (i.e. existing waste entrepreneurship practices) as they remind involved officers of their own past activities and organizational repertoire. Moreover, most of the people who participated in the elaboration and implementation of KISWAMP have changed to different positions in different organizations before and after KISWAMP (interview with municipal officer), in this way contributing to further diffuse ideas, such as waste entrepreneurship or waste transfer stations among the practitioners in the field and turning these ideas into persuasive master ideas (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996).
many neighbourhoods, many residents still do not see waste collection as a service that they are willing to pay for, different from, for example, water supply or toilets. Additionally, other groups, such as landlords, were not included in the framing of KISWAMP, and they are critical gatekeepers against the inclusion of waste services as critical and unavoidable ones. Finally, informal settlements with lower-income residents, such as Obunga, were left out of the reframing by KISWAMP. Among other reasons, absence of sufficient economic resources and lack of strong resident associations dissuaded project managers from implementing KISWAMP in settlements such as Obunga.

**Anchoring**

To gain internal adopters within the municipality, politicians and municipal officers were trained and engaged in a number of activities to support the new perception of waste resulting from KISWAMP’s reframing of waste management. A network of local waste actors was created and strengthened to secure cooperation (e.g. through joint study trips to other cities). Yet, the subsequent scattering of officers and politicians into other positions weakened the anchoring of the programme into the city’s management budgets and decision-making processes.

However, KISWAMP succeeded well in linking the project to existing waste entrepreneur practices in informal settlements, in strengthening these entrepreneurs and in recruiting new ones. Training, access to credits and networking were the strategies used by KISWAMP to anchor the idea of waste entrepreneurs as providers of waste collection services in informal settlements and as sources of employment. In particular, KISWAMP succeeded to knot a tighter network between the involved actors, for example, by creating collaborative platforms where actors could reflect and exchange experiences and knowledge (Granovetter, 1985).

Existing and new entrepreneurs delivering quality services generated trust among residents of informal settlements and, by doing so, anchored these new services into the everyday practices of households. The fact that entrepreneurs often worked in the same neighbourhoods where they lived contributed further to the anchoring of these new household waste practices. As local entrepreneurs, they were embedded in socio-spatial and commercial relations of proximity and trust in their neighbourhoods, making use of the social capital available (Mair and Martí, 2006; Barinaga, 2013; Gutberlet et al., 2016; Zapata Campos and Zapata 2013b). As a result, many residents started paying for waste collection instead of just dumping their waste in their neighbourhoods (interview with waste entrepreneur). Conversely, in the informal settlements left out of the framing of the project, such as Obunga, distrust and resentment grew after the implementation of KISWAMP (interview with waste entrepreneur), partially explaining the weak replication to these parts of the city and the concentration of dumped waste in public spaces.

The waste transfer points and the skips were ideas that were not sufficiently formally anchored in the residents’ practices, in local design and materials and in ongoing waste activities. Nevertheless, the idea stayed on, though blurred and twisted, as residents continued disposing of their waste at these points even when the skips rusted and disappeared.

Although the ideas of waste transfer points and PPPs are fading away, they are now being recovered by KUP in the new waste strategy. KUP aims to stabilize these two components that were insufficiently anchored by KISWAMP. Previous studies on policy implementation show that ‘an idea cannot catch on unless it already exists for some time in many people’s minds, as part of a master-idea’ (Czarniawska-Joerges and Joerges, 1996:36). Unlike the waste entrepreneurship model, waste transfer points and PPPs were new ideas brought by KISWAMP to Kisumu. If they now, to some extent, have gained the position of master ideas as a result of KISWAMP, the chances for them to catch on and anchor in informal settlements could be higher with the new KUP programme.

Furthermore, how ‘global ideas’ or notions of efficient waste management in informal settlements (e.g. waste transfer points) succeed to travel and be translated into practice, or not, has been associated with the perceived legitimacy of the organization that carries the idea itself (Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2014). KUP thus seems to be consolidative of ideas previously disseminated by KISWAMP. In the words of the consultant in charge of the review of the programme, ‘I’m not going to push new ideas in the review of KISWAMP’, meaning that the purpose is to scale up KISWAMP’s experimental achievements by anchoring already existing practices such as local waste entrepreneurs, vanished waste transfer points and pro-poor PPPs. Previous research also shows how it takes many
ideas to accomplish one simple action (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). For waste entrepreneurs in informal settlements to efficiently collect household waste, more stable collaborative arrangements between entrepreneurs and the city have to be established, for example, securing that waste transfer points are evacuated regularly (Joshi and Moore, 2004; Zapata and Zapata Campos, 2014; Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013b).

**Muddling through**

Despite the efforts made by KISWAMP to formalize informal waste entrepreneurship, the provision of these services still relies on informal work and relations. In other words, the provision of critical waste services remains loosely coupled to formal work. Waste pickers continue gaining low salaries and suffer from health issues, abuse and the vulnerability of fluctuating market prices and tariffs. As a result, informal waste pickers have to muddle through their daily livelihoods to guarantee their daily survival (Gutberlet et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2008).

Residents also continue to dispose of their waste at the waste transfer points, where the infrastructure (the skips) is missing and the waste is seldom evacuated by the municipality. Even though this practice potentially is illegal, residents steer, or muddle through, their activities to turn ‘bad’ into ‘less bad’ circumstances (Long, 2001) to cope with the lack of infrastructure and service provision.

Finally, the city’s waste policy and its implementation are also loosely coupled due to an insufficient anchoring in human and material resources. For example, an insufficient budget is allocated for the waste trucks, and the waste truck drivers have to find different arrangements with local waste pickers to purchase fuel and evacuate waste from informal settlements to the city dump. As a result of this, pro-poor partnerships remain arbitrary and loosely coupled arrangements, as has been shown by studies in other cities and regions (Yates and Gutberlet, 2011; Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013a; Furedy, 1992; Joshi and Moore, 2004). Similarly, as there was no budget nor financial mechanisms to maintain the skips, when the first ones rusted or were stolen, they were never replaced. Instead, the city’s waste workers now have to do whatever they can to evacuate the waste amassing at these locations but with a highly unsatisfactory outcome.

All in all, the implementation of KISWAMP responds to strategies of muddling through at all levels and illustrates the everyday challenges of governing urban informality (Roy and Alsayyad, 2004).

**CONCLUSIONS**

This paper has contributed to bridge a gap in the policy implementation studies, bringing together literature on policy implementation practice (e.g. Long, 2001; Mosse, 2004; Rap, 2006;; Heeks and Stanforth, 2014) and organization studies (Zapata and Zapata Campos, 2014, Czarniawska, 2002) by originally showing how policies and plans, or rather accounts of them, are adopted, translated and transformed by reframing, anchoring and muddling through (Czarniawska, 2002; 2004) practices. Reframing, anchoring and muddling through are not only three particular aspects of policy implementation practice. They can also be a useful analytical framework to open up the black box of policy implementation, as shown in this paper. The paper shows how reframing (Snow et al., 1986) the status and legitimacy of public policies and critical services among city officers, politicians and residents contributes to render a given policy meaningful and thereby facilitate policy implementation processes. What is put into a policy frame and what is left outside affect what meanings and interests and which actors, communities, parts of the city (as informal settlements) and entire territories are included, excluded or weakly represented.

The paper has also demonstrated how both the anchoring of policies and plans into existing local practices, institutional arrangements, budgets and decision-making processes and the enrolling of policy actors (i.e. officers, politicians, entrepreneurs or residents) become critical everyday practices to overcome resistance and to prompt policy implementation (e.g. Sulle, 2010). If insufficiently anchored, accounts of a policy (or a whole policy) can fade away (Zapata and Zapata Campos, 2013b, 2014). Yet, this research has also contributed to show that policies, or at least parts of ideas and solutions incorporated in such policies, need to exist for some time in a community of practice and become taken-for-granted solutions or master ideas (Czarniawska-Joerges and Joerges, 1996), for them to eventually be recovered by new policies and plans.

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Finally, city officers, politicians and residents have to in good terms in a context of loosely coupled policies, discretionary government arrangements or simply the lack of infrastructures and services. In Lindblom’s words, policy actors have to muddle through (Lindblom, 1959, 1979), and we add, by engaging in informal practices. The paper confirms that an analysis of the role of the political and the informal beyond linear and rational views of policy implementation, as argued before by Bogason and Toonen (1998) or Heeks and Stanforth (2014), contributes to a better understanding of the gap between policy ambitions and outcomes (Long, 2001; Mosse, 2004; Rap, 2006).

The paper has also contributed to shed light on how policies and their associated practices and ideas succeed to travel as best practices (Czarniawska, 2002; Mosse, 2004), which raises questions for future research about who benefits from the generation of such ‘exemplary’ knowledge. An explicit aim of KISWAMP was the promotion of the model in other cities in the region. Despite the diversity of challenges linked to the improvement of waste management in informal settlements, UN-Habitat and others tend to develop and spread generic solutions, such as youth groups as waste entrepreneurs and waste transfer points. These agencies function as carriers of public management knowledge, with a huge capacity to spread practices and master ideas. KISWAMP was instrumental for UN-Habitat to exhibit such practices and ideas to a wider audience. In the words of a UN-Habitat official, ‘we wanted governments to take up what we had developed and had demonstrated what was workable’.

These organizations, being development brokers (Mosse and Lewis, 2006) or idea-carriers, are interested in experimentation, in finding best practices and developing standard solutions/master ideas that can be replicated elsewhere (Zapata and Zapata Campos, 2014). This is why, when asked about KISWAMP, the UN-Habitat official valued it as ‘it demonstrated something’ and ‘it was useful’. The fact that some officials in UN-Habitat interpret KISWAMP as a success, while local actors see it as a failure, illustrates how implementation of policies is not about whether or not these policies succeed to work but how they work and for whom, where and when. This finding is consistent with previous research on policy implementation practice, revealing how success is based on cultural and political performance and interpretations, rather than on evidence of improved performance (Mosse, 2004; Rap, 2006).

For an organization oriented towards knowledge development, such as UN-Habitat, and the generation of master ideas/best practices, the loosely coupled (or even malfunctioning) relations between KISWAMP and the practices it sought to change, it was not an obstacle to turn some of its components into best practices to be spread to other cities and governments. The success of the policy is presented as self-evident, explaining its own diffusion (Rap, 2006). By repackaging only parts of KISWAMP, they succeeded to abstract the solutions from their context and interpret them as successes when juxtaposed to already existing master ideas (Mosse, 2004). In this way, the master ideas are not affected by the specificities of how well they were brought into practice (reframed, anchored and muddled through) in their prior place and time.

For the Obunga residents, KISWAMP failed to frame Obunga into its scope of activities and did not deliver the vital services the neighbourhood had been deprived of. For municipal and county officers, KISWAMP is nevertheless recalled as something positive, and as a result, the new KUP waste management strategy retakes and strives to implement parts of it. One may reflect if these officers build their image of KISWAMP on the story told by UN-Habitat and donor agencies or reflect on the experiences of residents and waste entrepreneurs. This is important because being adopted as a success story within the policy networks and cultures (Rap, 2006) of donor agencies does not necessarily guarantee success also in the more complex realities of the poorer neighbourhoods of Kisumu. Future research should examine whether the real beneficiaries (i.e. the urban poor) really take advantage of the production and travel of novel ideas/knowledge beyond the benefits for the idea carriers (Borda-Rodríguez and Johnson, 2013), such as consultants, NGOs, development agencies or researchers like us.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research project has been funded by the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy through its research programme made by the government of Sweden (SIDA). The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy and are those of the authors.
APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF FIELDWORK ACTIVITIES

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<th>Informants</th>
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<td>Fieldwork activities 2–9 May 2014</td>
<td>City dump site</td>
<td>Officers and informal waste pickers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>5 local waste NGOs and CBOs</td>
<td>Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>4 local waste-recycling entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>2 ward offices, resident associations</td>
<td>Ward representatives and residents in Obunga and Nyalenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single and group interviews with 46 informants</td>
<td>Informal settlements of Kisumu, various offices of private and public agencies and in connection with workshops</td>
<td>Informal waste pickers, residents, Kisumu city officers, Kisumu county officers, local CBO and NGO representatives, waste-recycling entrepreneurs, national ministry officer, university researchers, UN-Habitat officers, international donor representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop 5 May (19 participants, excluding research team)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Informal waste pickers, Kisumu city officers, Kisumu county officers, local CBO and NGO representatives, waste-recycling entrepreneurs, ministry officer, UN-Habitat officers, international donor representative, university researchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop 6 May (24 participants, excluding research team)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Continues)
### Fieldwork activities 12–22 August 2014
- **2 focus group discussions** with 10 and 8 waste scavengers respectively
- **2 focus group discussions** with 25 and 25 residents respectively
- **10 interviews**
  - Waste scavengers in Nyalenda and Obunga
  - Residents in Nyalenda and Obunga
  - Informal settlements of Kisu
  - Waste-recycling entrepreneurs, Kisumu city officers, local NGO representatives, waste-recycling entrepreneurs, city politicians, UN-Habitat officer

### Fieldwork activities 28 October–3 November, 2015
- **4 presentations of research findings and recommendations:**
  - to Obunga stakeholders, the Kisumu city manager, the county chief of environment and the county governor
- **Seminar/workshop in Kisumu to present research findings and recommendations to ICLD and others**
- **Workshop with ICLD guests for presentation of project findings to the residents of Obunga**
  - ICLD
  - ICLD and Obunga resident association

### Activity Organizers and level of financial support
- **Obunga clean-up exercise 16 August 2014**
  - Research team planned with full financial support
- **Obunga clean-up exercise 20 September 2014**
  - Research team planned with full financial support
- **Obunga clean-up exercise 18 October 2014**
  - Research team planned with reduced financial support
- **Obunga clean-up exercise 29 November 2014**
  - Research team with minimal financial support
- **Nyalenda clean-up exercise 21 March 2015**
  - Research team with minimal financial support
- **Obunga clean-up exercise, Obunga starlite clean up on 28 March 2015**
  - Research team with no financial support